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Abstract  
Investment behavior at the firm level is characterized by lumpy adjustments and frequent 
periods  of  inactivity.  Low  investment  rates  are  particularly  puzzling  in  transition 
economies  where  an  urgent  need  of  modernization  exists.  The  literature  offers  two 
explanations  for.  Firstly,  neo-institutional  finance  theory  focuses  on  the  impacts  of 
imperfect capital markets on investment decisions showing that the limited availability of 
financial funds may confine firms’ investments. Secondly, real options theory asserts that 
the interaction of irreversibility, uncertainty and flexibility may also result in investment 
reluctance. In this paper we suggest a generalized model that combines imperfect capital 
markets and real options effects. We also offer an econometric implementation that has 
the structure of a generalized tobit model. This model is applied to German farm panel 
data.  We  demonstrate  that  ignoring  real  options  effects  may  lead  to  erroneous  results 
when estimating the impact of imperfect capital markets on investment decisions. 
 
Keywords:  investment  decision;  irreversibility;  uncertainty;  q-model;  capital  market 
imperfections; generalized tobit model; transition 
JEL classification: D81; D92; O12  
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Observed investment behavior at the firm level is characterized by lumpy investments and 
frequent periods of inactivity. Low investment rates are particularly puzzling in transition 
economies where an urgent need of modernization and rationalization exists. Numerous 
studies  have  already  tried  to  provide  a  better  understanding  of  firm-level  investment 
pointing  out  the  important  role  of  finance  (amongst  others,  BOND  and  MEGHIR  1994; 
GILCHRIST  and  HIMMELBERG  1998  and  for  agricultural  investment  e.g.,  BENJAMIN  and 
PHIMISTER 2002; BARRY, BIERLEN and SOTOMAYOR 2000). As imperfect capital markets 
are characterized by informational asymmetries and agency problems induce transaction 
costs,  a  gap  between  firms’  cost  for  internal  and  external  finance  arises.  Henceforth, 
investment  and  finance  decisions  are  not  separate
1.  This  is  in  particular  the  case  in 
transition  economies  where  underdeveloped  institutions  and  weak  macroeconomic 
conditions lead even to constrained capital access (amongst others, PAVEL, SHERBAKOV 
and VERSTYUK 2004; RIZOV 2004). The aforementioned empirical studies affirm a direct 
effect of imperfect capital markets. Therefore, the well known standard investment model 
with strictly convex costs attached to adjusting the capital stock is extended by imposing 
financial  restrictions  in  order  to  account  for  costly  or  limited  access  to  capital. 
Accordingly, investment is sensitive to the cash flow as a proxy for internal financial 
ability (BOND and VAN REENEN 2003). 
However,  the  extended  standard  investment  model  fails  to  explain  observed  lumpy 
investment  (CHIRINKO  1993).  An  alternative  explanation  of  investment  reluctance  is 
offered  by  the  real  options  theory,  that  has  a  close  relationship  to  the  stochastic 
adjustment cost theory. Real options theory affirms that inaction periods occur when costs 
for  the  adjustment  of  the  capital  stock  are  at  least  partially  sunken  (irreversible)  and 
future  revenues  are  uncertain.  Costly  reversibility  arises  when  installing  new  capital 
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 HUBBARD (1998) gives a comprehensive review about imperfect capital markets.   3 
involves costly learning or disruption costs, or alternatively when high capital specificity 
leads  to  a  lack  of  resale  possibilities.  Of  particular  interest  is  the  interaction  of 
uncertainty,  irreversibility  and  the  opportunity  to  postpone  investment  (DIXIT  and 
PINDYCK 1994). This means, investment is influenced by the value of the real option to 
invest and delaying investment might become optimal. In this context, a more general 
form of the adjustment cost function is required in order to account for irreversibility 
(HAMERMESH  and  PFANN  1996).  It  is  assumed  that  these  costs  are  asymmetric,  only 
partially convex and kinked at zero investment (CABALLERO 1997). The resulting optimal 
path  of  investment  depending  on  the  marginal  valuation  of  capital  is  non-smooth  and 
characterized by a range of inaction. For instance ABEL and EBERLY (2002), NILSEN and 
SCHIANTARELLI  (2003)  or  LETTERIE  and  PFANN  (2007)  give  empirical  evidence  about 
asymmetric adjustments of the capital stock.  
This  study  strongly  recommends  that  imperfect  capital  markets  inducing  additional 
transaction costs are a major determinant of investments. In transition economies these 
effects  are  expected  to  be  even  more  pronounced  as  weak  macroeconomic  conditions 
hinder the development of capital markets. However, impacts of imperfect capital market 
cannot solely explain empirical investment behavior characterized by reluctance. We aim 
to advance the understanding of investment behavior and endorse that costly reversibility 
and uncertain future expectations are major determinants along with the availability of 
finance.  Thus,  we  combine  issues  of  two  strands  of  investment  literature  –  the  neo-
institutional finance theory and the real options theory. To our knowledge do empirical 
applications  so  far  not  provide  any  bridging  application.  Accordingly,  this  is  the 
innovative  part  and  the  main  contribution  of  this  study  as  more  recent  papers  do  not 
combine these aspects (LENSINK and BO 2001).    4 
For these purposes we develop an extended q-model with the intention of exploring the 
coexistence  of  capital  market  imperfections, irreversibility and uncertainty referring to 
ABEL and EBERLY (1994). The empirical model has the structure of a generalized tobit 
model. By means of this model we intend to show that simpler linear models, assuming a 
smooth adjustment of the capital stock over time, fail to explain empirical investment 
behavior when capital market imperfections, costly reversibility and uncertainty coexist. 
The application of this model to German farm level panel data aims to investigate first, if 
and how imperfect capital markets, irreversibility and uncertainty jointly affect empirical 
farm investment behavior. The second objective is to substantiate if farms in transition 
economies  are  confronted  with  higher  transaction  costs  induced  by  higher  degrees  of 
informational asymmetries. The more precise question is to find out whether these farms 
show  a  higher  investment  cash  flow  sensitivity.  The  comparison  of  West  and  East 
Germany delivers insights into the differences between established market economies and 
transition economies.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, background information on 
the rural capital market in Germany is given. The theoretical basis and the extended q-
model  follow.  Next,  the  econometric  model  is  presented,  followed  by  the  descriptive 
evidence  and  results.  Finally,  concluding  remarks  and  suggestions  for  future  research 
round off the paper.  
Agricultural Finance in Germany  
Like  most  other  small  and  medium  size  firms,  farms  in  Germany  have  limited  direct 
access to capital markets. Major sources of investment financing are self financing and 
debt financing. The latter is particularly important for expanding farms. The largest part 
of agricultural investments is financed by bank credits (76 %) which is comparably high. 
Credit  substitutes,  for  instance  leasing,  are  not  yet  widespread  in  agricultural  finance   5 
(BAHRS, FUHRMANN and MUZIOL 2004). Within the bank credits the cooperative banks 
have the largest share of agricultural credits by about 47 %, private credit banks and the 
local savings banks have a share of 12 % and 33 %, respectively. Such credits are mainly 
long term credits with fixed interest rates. More recently, there is a strong tendency with a 
reduced  period  with  fixed  interest  rates  (BLISSE  et  al.  2004).  Additionally,  programs 
offered by the Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank
2 are available. These credits are designed 
for farms and characterized by more favorable conditions compared to banks. However, 
the access to debt capital is different in West and East Germany. These differences, which 
were most pronounced immediately after the German reunification in 1990, vanish in the 
course of time, but still exist. 
In  the  transition  period  of  East  Germany,  starting  in  1989,  macroeconomic  stability 
established  rather  quickly  compared  to  other  Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries. 
This  rapidly  established  stability  was  a  precondition  for  the  development  of  financial 
markets and a banking system. Actually, most of the major West German banks expanded 
to East Germany and established a network of branch offices comparable to those in the 
old  federal  states.  Nevertheless,  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineties  financial  problems 
hindered the development of competitive farms in East Germany (ROTHE and LISSITSA 
2005). Former co-operatives, state owned farms as well as newly established farms had an 
enormous capital demand for replacement and expansion investments. Contrary, banks 
were reluctant to issue loans for the following reasons. First of all, the restructured or 
newly established farms had no history in the sense of documented economic performance 
under market conditions. The assessment of credit worthiness, however, is usually based 
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  This  bank  is  a  public  law  institution  with  the  aim  to  support  the  agricultural  sector.  The 
Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank provides refinancing for all types of projects associated with agriculture 
or rural areas within the European Union.   6 
on past financial records. A second problem concerned missing collateral. Farms in East 
Germany showed a low equity share. This difference of financial leverage can be traced 
back to the unequal share of leased land. While family farms in West Germany own about 
50 percent of their land, farms in East Germany typically operate on leased land (with a 
share of 90 %). The problem of missing collaterals was aggravated by the legal status 
chosen  by  the  former  socialistic  cooperatives  and  state  owned  farms.  The  dominating 
legal  forms  of  successors  of  the  former  socialistic  farms  were  co-operatives,  stock 
companies and corporations, which are all characterized by limited liability. In addition, 
the property rights of the farms’ assets were unclear for a rather long time period. Finally, 
the  access  to  debt  capital  was  frequently  hindered  by  the  existence  of  old  credits 
stemming from the socialistic period. Though there was a partial debt relief, considerable 
debt was remaining without corresponding assets of comparable value. 
In  view  of  the  aforementioned  peculiarities  of  East  German  farms  we  conjecture  that 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the lender-borrower relationship are more 
pronounced in these farms compared West German family farms. These problems come 
along  with  a  higher  default  risk  and/or  higher  transaction  costs  for  potential  lenders, 
which in turn may lead to higher cost of borrowing or credit rationing (BARRY, BIERLEN 
and SOTOMAYOR 2000). In other words, it can be hypothesized that the degree of capital 
market imperfections is different in both parts of Germany. As a result, the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment should be higher in East than in West German farms. Hence, the 
German  reunification  may  be  considered  as  a  natural  experiment  about  the  impact  of 
capital market imperfections on the investment behavior in agriculture. In what follows 
we examine this relationship empirically.   7 
A q-Model for Irreversible Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets 
We  refer  to  a  dynamic  and  stochastic  adjustment  cost  model  in  line  with  ABEL  and 
EBERLY (1994) or HAMERMESH (1992)
3. We extend this model in order to account for 
additional transaction cost induced by imperfect capital markets. 
Theoretical Model  
The partial equilibrium model comprises production and investments for a representative 
firm. The relationship between product price  t p  and quantity  t y  in continuous time  t  is 
described  by  an  iso-elastic  demand  function  with  a  stochastic  demand  parameter  t X  
described by a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM):  
t t t dX X dt X dz m s = × × + × ×     (1) 
where  m  denotes the drift rate, s  the standard deviation and  dz  is a Wiener increment 
denoting  productivity  shocks  that  capture  imperfect  competition  in  product  markets. 
Output is Cobb-Douglas in capital  t K  and labor  t L . Thereby is assumed that the latter can 
be adjusted without additional costs. Firm i maximizes the present value of net income 
depending upon its current capital stock  0 i K  and its initial stochastic demand variable 
0 i X . The maximized value of the firm ( it V ) is defined as the discounted difference of 
expected profits ( it p ) and the costs attached to adjusting the capital stock  1, ( , ) it it it C I K F -  
as a function of (dis)investments denoted by  it I , the capital stock  1 it K -  and finance  it F .  
0 0 1
0
( , ) max [ ( , , )] i X K
it
r t
it i i it it it it it
I
profit adjustmentcosts





- = × × - × × ∫ 14 4 244 3 144 244 3   (2) 
It  follows  that  ( ) ( )
( ) 1 1 (1 ) 1 0 h A
a a
a a a w
-
- = - × × > ,  where  A  denotes  a  technology 
parameter,  a  the production elasticity of labor and  w  refers to labor cost (ABEL and 
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 HAMERMESH (1992) presents this kind of model for labour adjustments.    8 
EBERLY 1994).  X
it h X
h ×  is the respective marginal revenue product of capital at time t, 
( ) 1 1 1 X h a = - >  and  1 = K h  denote the respective competition parameters of demand and 
capital.  i r  denotes the firm individual discount rate which is constant over time (BÖHM, 
FUNKE and SIGFRIED 1999).  
Costly  reversibility  and  possible  capital  market  imperfections  do  not  allow  the  use  of 
quadratic and symmetric adjustment costs. Hence, the adjustment cost function is: 
2
0





2 1 2 2 1 2
1 1
if 0
( , , ) 0 if 0
if 0
it it




it it it it
it it
I I
a a K b I g K d F I
K K
C I K F I
I I








 + × + × + × × + × × >  
  
 = = 

   + × + × + × × + × × <   
  
  (3) 
The  first  part  refers  to  costs  attached  to  investments,  the  last  part  describes  the  costs 
arising  by  disinvestments  and  when  the  firm  does  neither  invest  nor  disinvest  zero 
adjustment costs occur, i.e.  1, ( , ) 0 it it it C I K F - = . 
The  first  term, 
0 a ,  represents  the  ‘true’  fixed  costs  independent  of  the  capital  stock 
whereas  the  second  term,  1/2 1 it a K - × ,  represents  fixed  costs  proportional  to  the  capital 
stock but independent of the level of investment. The third term,  1/2 it b I × , captures capital 
costs  which  are  proportional  to  investment.  Thereby  denotes  1 b   capital  costs  when 
investing  and  2 b   denotes  the  respective  cost  when  disinvesting.  These  could  be 
acquisition  cost  itself.  The  fourth  term,  ( )
2
1/2 1 1 it it it g I K K - - × × ,  represents  the  internal 
adjustment costs which are quadratic in investment and strictly convex as the traditional 
q-theory proposes (ABEL and EBERLY 2002). If reversibility is costly, it is essential that 
0 2 1 ³ ³b b   and  1 2 , 0 g g ³   (BÖHM,  FUNKE  and  SIGFRIED  1999).  This  gap  between  the 
acquisition  and  resale  price  of  capital  reflects  capital  specificity  and  accounts  for 
transaction  costs  when  adjusting  the  capital  stock  (COOPER  and  HALTIWANGER  2006).   9 
When  1/2 0 a >   and/or 
0 0 a >   fixed  (sunk)  costs  are  connected  with  the  investment 
decision and are completely sunken. 
By means of the last term,  ( ) 1/2 1 it it it d I K F - × × , additional costs are incorporated arising 
when imperfect capital markets induce additional costs, for instance, transaction costs to 
acquire finance. Intuitively, when capital markets are imperfect, informational and agency 
problems  induce  transaction  costs.  Hence,  investment  and  finance  decisions  are  not 
separable.  Firms  with  a  low  financial  ability  need  to  acquire  costly  capital  as  equity 
capital does not suffice. Accordingly,  it F  represents financial variables and accounts for 
the  relationship  between  transaction  costs  and  the  internal  financial  ability.  The 
investment sensitivity to those variables that proxy internal funds give evidence about 
imperfect capital markets (HUBBARD 1998).  
The firm’s maximization is subject to the evolvement of the capital stock over time: 
( ) 1 1 it i it it K K I d - = - × +     (4) 
where  i d   denotes  the  depreciation  rate.  In  accordance  with  the  dynamic  programming 
approach the optimal path of investment follows the Bellman equation. We now define 
1 it it it q V K - = ¶ ¶  as the marginal valuation of a unit of installed capital. Hence, the optimal 
path  of  investment  solves  the  term  { } 1 max ( , , ) it it it it it
I
C I K F I q - - + × .  As  usual,  the  first 
order condition (FOC) leads to the optimal investment rate ( 1 it it I K
+
- ) and disinvestment 
rate ( 1 it it I K
-
- ). However, since the maximand is zero when the firm does neither invest 
nor disinvest, it is required that  it q  should pass the upper ( 1it q ) threshold which is derived 
by finding a value for  it q  solving  1 ( , , ) it it it it it I q C I K F
+ +
- × > . Investment occurs as  
1 1






I F b d
q
K g g g K
+
- -
= - + × - ×     (5a) 
when    10 
0
1







q q b a g d
K K - -
×
> = + × + × + ×    (5b) 
and accordingly disinvestment occurs as  
2 2






I F b d
q
K g g g K
-
- -
= - + × - ×     (6a) 
when  it q  passes the respective lower ( 2it q ) threshold which is similarly derived by finding 
a value for  it q  solving  1 ( , , ) it it it it it I q C I K F
- -
- × < . Thus, disinvestment is induced when 
0
2







q q b a g d
K K - -
×
< = + × + × + ×   (6b) 
and when  2 1   it it it q q q £ £ zero investment is optimal. This range of  it q  is also known as 
the  range  of  inaction.  Intuitively,  the  dependence  on  the  financial  ability  induced  by 
imperfect capital markets ( 1/ 2 1 it it d F K - × ) widens the range of inaction such that: the larger 
the financial ability, the smaller is the increase of the range of inaction. Similarly, the 
lower the financial ability of a firm the larger is the increase of the range of inaction. In 
the empirical application to German farm level panel data we represent financial ability 
by  the  cash  flow.  In  order  to  ensure  this  relationship  between  transaction  costs  and 
finance an inverse cash flow-adjustment-cost-relationship is required
4. Accordingly, the 
model comprises irreversible investment and impacts of imperfect capital markets on the 
optimal path of investment.  
                                                 
4 In the empirical data set we expect also a negative cash flow. In order to avoid distortions in this case we 
use the cash flow and not the inverse cash flow in the empirical model specification. We expect that the 
inverse relation should be represented by the estimated coefficients.   11 
In all cases,  it q  refers to the shadow value of capital defined as the discounted future 
expectations of the marginal productivity of a unit of installed capital. ABEL and EBERLY 




0 0.5 ( 1)
X
i i X r s it
it t it s
i i X X i
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= × × =
+ - × × - × ∫   (7) 
According  to  (7),  it q   is  proportional  to  the  average  capital  productivity  measured  by 
market  data.  The  important  feature  of  this  specification  is  the  incorporation  of  the 
variance  (
2
i s )  of  the  stochastic  part  of  the  demand  function  accounting  for  uncertain 
future revenues. By means of this specification uncertainty directly affects  it q . It follows 
that  an  increase  in  i s   increases  it q .  As  investments  and  it q   are  positively  related  an 
increasing volatility rises investment. However, if the initial value of  it q  is in the range of 
inaction, a small increase in  i s  does not induce an investment or disinvestment (ABEL 
and EBERLY 1993)
5.  
Econometric Model  
We use farm level panel data which do not contain any market information to construct 
it q   as  defined  above.  However,  an  average-type  proxy  variable  would  even  be 
inappropriate in this context. In order to make the model estimable  it q  is approximated in 
terms of observable variables: 
' it it it q Z b e = +     (8) 
where  b   is  a  parameter  vector  to  be  estimated  and  it Z   is the information set for  it q  
containing variables which proxy the information about the shadow value of capital. For 
the first set of variables, in line with NILSEN, SALVANES and SCHIANTARELLI (2007), it is 
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 For a further discussion see ABEL et al. (1996).    12 
assumed that the shadow value of capital is proportional to the sales (revenues) to capital 
ratio,  ( )it S K . This holds when the production function is Cobb Douglas in labor and 
capital. Further, it is assumed that the firm acts as a price taker, the operating profit  it p  is 
proportional to the capital stock and farms use an AR(2) process to forecast the sales to 
capital  ratio.  Hence,  present,  once  lagged  and  twice  lagged  values  as  well  as  the 
respective quadratic terms of the sales to capital ratio are used in the information set. The 
second  approximation  set of variables refers to this definition of the shadow value of 





( , , )
i i r s




- = - × ∫  
Thus, the information set of  it q  consists alternatively of first order lags and the respective 
quadratic terms of the profit to capital ratio in line with LETTERIE and PFANN (2007). In 
order to account for the stochastic demand function and uncertain future revenues we use 
additionally the deviation of revenue changes over the years,  i s . We are aware that this is 
a very simple approximation of the shadow value of capital, however, we provide several 
variations of the information set.  
The used approximation of  it q  (8) introduces the error terms  it e  which are assumed to be 
normally independently distributed (n.i.d.) with variance 
2
e s . These reflect idiosyncratic 
shocks which are not observable to the econometrician. The disturbances account also for 
measurement errors within the estimation of the shadow value of capital. Accordingly, the 
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g g b g e
- - -
- -
+ + + × + <     (10b) 
where  it CF  denotes the cash flow of farm i at time t.  
Estimation  
This model has the structure of a generalized two-sided tobit model (DIIORIO and FACHIN 
2006 refer to a double censored tobit model). The parameter estimates can be obtained by 
either maximum likelihood estimation of the full model or alternatively by a two-stage 
method.  For  convenience  we  use  the  two-stage  Heckman  procedure  (HECKMAN  1976, 
1979; CAMERON and TRIVEDI 2005). In the first step, we estimate a generalized ordered 
probit model (BOES and WINKELMANN 2006) to derive the probabilities of investment, 
disinvestment and inaction. Using these results of the first stage we obtain the shadow 
value of capital  it q . In addition, the results from the first step are used to estimate the 
necessary selectivity regressors. These are required in the second stage to account for the 
sample selection bias induced by the selection equations (9b) and (10b). These regressors 
are also known as inverse Mill’s ratios. In the second step, the (dis)investment functions 
((9a) and (10a)) are estimated using the Mill’s ratios as additional explanatory variables. 
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  In  order  to  make  the  model  estimable  the  thresholds 
1 q   and 
2 q   are  linearly  approximated: 
0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1
it it b a g K a g K g g
+ +
- - + × × + × @ + ×  and 
0
2 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1
it it b a g K a g K g g
- -
- - - × × + × @ + × .    14 
This ensures that the parameter estimates of the investment and disinvestment functions 
are unbiased and consistent (MADDALA 1983).  
For the generalized ordered probit model the dummy variable 
D
it I  is defined indicating 
whether a firm invests ( 1
D
it I = ), disinvests ( 1
D
it I = - ) or is inactive ( 0
D
it I = ). The inverse 
capital stock,  1 1 it K - , enters the model only through the selection equations (9b) and (10
b) and gives therefore an useful exclusion restriction to identify the model (CAMERON and 
TRIVEDI 2005). The generalized ordered probit model can be written as:  
1
0 1 1 2 1
1
1
0 1 1 2 1
1
1 1
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where  ( ) F ×  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The parameters 
can only be identified up to a scale parameter and are normalized by  e s  which will be 
denoted by ~.  
For  the  second  step  it  is  necessary  to  define  the  inverse  Mill’s  ratios  for  the 
(dis)investment  equations,  it l
+   and  it l
-,  respectively.  These  account  for  the  non-linear 
selection  and  are  defined  as  the  expected  value  of  it e   conditional  on  being  in  the 
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  (12b)   15 
where  ( ) f ×   denotes  the  standard  normal  density  function.  Accordingly,  the  resulting 
equations for the second stage are defined as follows.  
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- -
= + × + + × + %    (13b) 
where  it u
+ and  it u
- are zero mean error terms. The parameters are defined as  0 1 1 2 c b g
+ = - , 
0 2 2 2 c b g
- = - ,  2 1 1 2 c d g
+ = - ,  2 2 2 2 c d g
- = -  ((5a) and (6a)). The Mills ratios ( it l
+  and  it l
-) 
are  multiplied  by  the  parameters  1 c
+ or  1 c
- ,  respectively,  as  the  error  terms  enter  the 
equation  through  the  proxy  variable  for  it q   (NILSEN,  SALVANES  and  SCHIANTARELLI 
2007). It is assumed that  it Z  are uncorrelated with the errors  it u
+,  it u
- and  it e  to ensure that 
the generalized ordered probit model yields consistent estimates and standard errors of 
the  parameters.  As  there  is  only  one  single  generated  regressor  for  each  equation  the 
asymptotic t-statistics can be used for inference and the estimators are consistent (PAGAN 
1984).  
In order to demonstrate the advantages of our approach a simpler linear benchmark model 
is defined. The model represents that kind of model which is often used in the analysis of 
empirical investment behavior as described in BOND and VAN REENEN (2003) or ADDA 
and COOPER (2003).  










a a b a
- -
 
= + × + × +  
 
%     (14) 
where the superscript b denotes the benchmark model. The disturbances  it u  are assumed 
to  be  identically  independently  distributed  (i.i.d).  A  significant  cash  flow  parameter 
indicates the dependence of finance and therefore imperfect capital markets. However, 
this kind of model does not account for any costly reversibility and ignores furthermore   16 
the bias in the linear estimation without selectivity regressors. By means of this model the 
ambition  is  to  find  out  how  simpler  linear  models  behave  in  comparison  to  the 
generalized tobit model with respect to the cash flow sensitivity. The ambition is to show 
that the 2-sided tobit model is the appropriate specification when explaining investment 
behavior.  It  is  expected  that  the  parameter  estimates  of  the  benchmark  model  differ 
significantly from those given by the second stage regressions.  
Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We use farm level panel data from the national German farm accountancy data network 
(FADN) covering the years from 1996 to 2006 (from here: BMELV Testbetriebsnetz). 
This dataset is based on annual balance sheet data from representative farms in Germany 
and  must  conform  to  consistent  accounting  procedures  given  by  the  European 
Commission  (EU  COMMISSION  1989).  Specialists  in  horticulture,  orchards,  fishery  and 
forestry  are  excluded  as  those  have  a  different  capital  structure  and  are  difficult  to 
compare with specialists in agriculture. In the estimation only farms with at least four 
consecutive years are considered to ensure consistency, particularly in the estimation of 
i s , the measure of uncertainty. Outliers are imposed by removing farms from the data 
sample  that  are  below  the  1 %  percentile  and  above  the  99 %  percentile  of  the 
(dis)investment capital ratio and the sales to capital ratio. These rules are common in 
investment  literature  (BENJAMIN  and  PHIMISTER  2002;  GILCHRIST  and  HIMMELBERG 
1998). Accordingly, the used data set is unbalanced and contains roughly 12 500 farms 
(approximately 2 100 in the East and 10 400 in the West) with 6.9 years on average
7.  
 
                                                 
7
 It has to be acknowledged that the sample is not fully representative as we do not use any aggregation 
factors.    17 
35 %  of  the  observations  in  the  West  are  zero  investments  and  23 %  are  investments 
whereas in the East 17 % are zero investments and 36 % investments. This indicates for 
East and West unequal proportions and the largest share of observations belongs to the 
disinvestment  regime.  Information  on annual investments are presented in table 1. For 
each year available in the data set the mean investment rate of Germany, East and West 
Germany is given.  
Table 1. Annual Investment Rates for Germany 
mean no. of mean number of mean no. of
investment rate  observations investment rate  observations investment rate  observations
1996 0.10 2 520 0.08 1 954 0.16 566
1997 0.10 2 712 0.09 2 148 0.14 564
1998 0.10 2 827 0.09 2 278 0.15 549
1999 0.11 2 269 0.10 1 708 0.14 561
2000 0.10 2 558 0.09 2 024 0.13 534
2001 0.09 2 721 0.09 2 139 0.11 582
2002 0.11 2 228 0.10 1 680 0.14 548
2003 0.11 2 170 0.11 1 605 0.13 565
2004 0.11 1 879 0.11 1 428 0.13 451
2005 0.11 2 041 0.10 1 492 0.12 549
2006 0.10 1 949 0.09 1 425 0.13 524
Note: The database is the BMELV Testbetriebsnetz 1996-2006.
Germany  West Germany East Germany
year
 
The aggregated investment rates are rather constant over time. However, in the Eastern 
federal states a higher variation and higher average investment rates are observable. This 
might  be  a  first  indication  for  necessary  modernization  investments  in  the  transition 
period. However, it needs to be acknowledged that the used capital stock in Eastern farms 
might be under-evaluated since it was installed before 1990.  
The  data  confirm  the  unequal  capital  structure  at  the  farm  level  in  East  and  West 
Germany.  The  average  equity  ratio  amounts  to  56 %  and  82 %  of  total  capital  stock, 
respectively. This rather high equity ratio in the West indicates financial strength of the 
farms which might additionally be a signal for a lower dependence on finance. In equal 
measure it can be shown that the average debt capital ratio (due to missing values in the 
data set only bank loans are considered) is only 17 % in the West whereas bank loans in   18 
the East are more important with a share by about 33 %. This comparably high share in 
the East signals a stronger dependency on the access to capital.  
In table 2 we present the ranked (dis)investment rates according to size using decentiles. 
The highest rank (1) implies the largest annual (dis)investment rate by the farm whereas 
rank 10 accounts for the smallest annual (dis)investment rate per farm. For each rank the 
number  of  observations,  the  mean  (dis)investment  rate  and  the  respective  standard 
deviation are given. 
Table 2. Ranked Investment and Disinvestment Rates for Germany  
no. of   standard  no. of   standard 
rank observations mean  deviation observations mean  deviation
1 2588 0.4267 0.1481 4420 -0.1374 0.0388
2 2587 0.1957 0.0230 4420 -0.0753 0.0082
3 2588 0.1246 0.0137 4420 -0.0542 0.0044
4 2587 0.0882 0.0078 4420 -0.0419 0.0028
5 2587 0.0654 0.0053 4420 -0.0339 0.0019
6 2588 0.0494 0.0041 4420 -0.0281 0.0015
7 2587 0.0371 0.0031 4420 -0.0235 0.0013
8 2588 0.0277 0.0026 4420 -0.0188 0.0012
9 2587 0.0188 0.0023 4420 -0.0144 0.0013
10 2587 0.0101 0.0033 4421 -0.0088 0.0023
Note: The database is the BMELV Testbetriebsnetz 1996-2006.
disinvestment rate investment rate 
 
The three highest ranks compared to the remaining ranks show comparably high means 
whereas the subsequent means in the lower ranks decline rapidly. In addition, rank one to 
three account for 74 % of the total investment expenditures. DOMS and DUNNE (1998) 
provide  simulated  rankings  and  show  that  the  expected  ranking  for  strictly  convex 
adjustment costs would induce a smooth decline with equal steps. Thus, the ranking of 
the  German  farm  level  panel  data  showing  unequal  steps  is  a  first  indication  for  a 
reluctant  investment  behavior  of  German  farms  accompanied  by  a  tendency  of  lumpy 
adjustment of the capital stock. Moreover, the mean disinvestment and investment rate 
(median)  over  all  observations  is  0.004  (0.01)  with  a  skewness  of  3.32.  The  mean   19 
(median) investment rate is 0.10 (0.05) and the mean (median) disinvestment rate is -0.04 
(-0.03). These findings indicate asymmetries in the adjustment of the capital stock.  
Summarizing, the basic features of the explanatory variables are shown in table 3 using 
the common summary statistics as the mean, the standard deviation, the skewness and 
kurtosis.  
Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Main Explanatory Variables 
no. of  standard 
variable observations min  max mean deviation skewness kurtosis
(I it/K it-1)
+ 25 874 0.001 0.833 0.104 0.129 2.606 10.815
(I it/K it-1)
- 44 201 -0.250 -0.001 -0.040 0.030 -2.160 8.505
(CF it/K it-1) 103 212 -7.505 3.229 0.028 0.127 0.787 179.894
(S/K) it 103 212 0.023 3.404 0.347 0.406 2.987 14.418
(S/K) it-1 85 562 0.023 3.402 0.335 0.336 2.961 14.319
s i 103 212 0.005 4.606 0.489 0.302 2.508 14.406
1/K it-1 103 212 2.850E-08 0.001 2.480E-06 5.120E-06 15.814 520.081
Note: The database is the BMELV Testbetriebsnetz, 1996-2006.  
Estimation Results  
The used data set is unbalanced whereas the panel mortality in the FADN is assumed to 
be fully exogenous. Hence, there is no need to account for any possible sample selection 
bias  founded  in  this  unbalanced  structure  (WOOLDRIDGE  2002).  All  estimation  results 
were obtained by STATA 9. We used several definitions of the information set for  it q , 
however,  the  results  are  similar,  thus  we  present  results  derived  by  this  set: 
( ) ( )
2
1 1 , , it i it it Z S K S K s
- -
  =  . It contains the first order lags and the respective quadratic 
term of the sales to capital ratio and the standard deviation of farm individual revenue 
changes,  i s , to account for uncertain future revenues. In all estimation steps a farm type   20 
dummy  it DT
8 and a size dummy  it DS
9 are used to reduce possible effects which could bias 
the  constant  terms.  Further,  farm  individual  averages  of  all  explanatory  variables  are 
included to account for possible heterogeneity between the farms
10.  
In table 4 the estimated coefficients of the generalized ordered probit model from the first 
stage  are  presented.  For  East  and  West  Germany  the  estimated  coefficients  and  the 
respective standard errors are given. It has to be considered that the point estimates are 
normalized by  e s . The marginal effects are not presented in detail. The results for East 
Germany support the complete information set of  it q  as the lagged sales to capital ratio as 
well as the respective quadratic term are significant at the usual levels. The sign of the 
quadratic term is rather unsatisfactory as it is negative. However, the point estimate is 
rather low and the net effect of the sales to capital ratio is still positive. This indicates an 
increasing investment probability with increasing revenues. Unexpectedly, the results for 
the Western federal states reject the lagged sales to capital ratio whereas the quadratic 
term is positively related to the investment probability and significantly different from 
zero. Thus, increasing revenues rise the probability to invest.  
                                                 
8
 Dummy variables for cash crop farms, pig and poultry farms, specialists in grazing livestock, permanent 
crops and mixed farms are defined referring to the standard gross margins.  
9
 Referring to standard classification criteria (EUROSTAT) for West Germany the following size classes are 
defined: 8-16 European Size Units (ESU), 16-50 ESU, 50-100 ESU and >100 ESU whereas for the East we 
use 8-16 ESU, 16-50 ESU, 50-100 ESU, 100-250 ESU and >250 ESU. 
10
 We are aware that this is a rather simple approximation in order to consider unobserved heterogeneity 
appropriately. The extension of the model specification with respect to random effects is left for future 
research.   21 
The findings affirm uncertainty belonging to the information set for  it q . At first glance 
the differing signs of the parameter estimates for  i s  between East and West Germany are 
surprising. Thereby, only the parameter estimates for East Germany are consistent with 
the theoretical model. The marginal effects for East and West are rather small but also 
differ by sign. An increase in uncertainty increases the probability to invest (+0.04) and 
induces  a  declining  probability  to  disinvest (-0.05). On the contrary, the estimates for 
West Germany indicate that an increase in uncertainty induces a decline in the probability 
to invest (-0.03) but increases probability to disinvest (+0.03).  
Table 4. Results from the First Stage Generalized Ordered Probit Model  





Variables of the investment and disinvestment thresholds q 1 and q 2
q 1 q 2 q 1 q 2
CF it/K it-1 0.963 0.906 0.404 0.835
[0.094]** [0.095]** [0.063]** [0.072]**
1/K it-1 -50 584 103 491 -22 361 120 907
[10 521]** [10 205]** [2 933]** [3 604]**
Constant 0.011 -0.066 -1.153 0.242
[0.100] [0.100] [0.094]** [0.076]**
Log-Likelihood
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. Single (*) and double (**) asterisks denote significant at 5 % and 1 %, respectively.  












West Germany East Germany
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The range of inaction depends on the constant, the inverse capital stock and the cash 
flow. If irreversibility is present, the parameter estimates for the constant terms and the 
inverse capital stock need to be significant with differing point estimates by investment 
and  disinvestment  probability.  To  induce  optimal  inactivity,  the  resulting  investment 
threshold  1it q   exceeds  the  disinvestment  threshold  2it q .  The  cash  flow  coefficient   22 
indicates additional transaction costs to acquire finance for investments and is expected to 
be significant if agency problems or informational asymmetries characterize the capital 
market. Imperfect capital markets should increase the range of inaction but an increasing 
financial ability should reduce the respective investment threshold.  
In the West, the point estimates of the constant, the inverse capital stock and the cash 
flow parameter differ significantly by the investment and disinvestment threshold which 
is  confirmed  by  the  Wald-test  rejecting  the  null  of  equal  parameters.  The  respective 
thresholds for West Germany are: 
1 1 1 ˆ ˆ 1.153 22230 0.404 it it it it it q q K CF K - - > = + - ×   (15a) 
2 1 1 ˆ ˆ 0.242 120970 0.835 it it it it it q q K CF K - - < = - - - ×   (15b) 
Using the means of the respective variables the upper threshold is on average 1.17 and the 
respective lower threshold is about -0.47. Interestingly, the thresholds might be negative 
inducing that even losses or in other words a negative capital productivity is possible 
without inducing a disinvestment.  
In the East, the constant term is rejected for the investment and disinvestment threshold. 
This implies that the range of inaction is mainly determined by the inverse capital stock, 
i.e. the size of the farm, and the cash flow. The parameter estimates for the capital stock 
differ  significantly  by  investment  and  disinvestment  threshold  indicating  a  range  of 
inactivity induced by costly reversibility. The parameter estimates for the cash flow do 
not significantly differ; the respective Wald-test cannot reject the null of equal estimates 
for the investment and disinvestment threshold. Accordingly, additional transaction costs 
due to capital market imperfections affect the investment and disinvestment decision at 
the same level.  
The cash flow sensitivity is of particular interest as it reflects imperfect capital markets. 
The results confirm weaker capital markets and a stronger dependence on finance for East   23 
Germany.  The  cash  flow  sensitivity  of  the  investment  trigger  (0.96)  exceeds  the 
respective  estimate  for  the  West  (0.40).  This  difference  in  the  cash  flow  sensitivity 
between  East  and  West  Germany  is  even  more  pronounced  when  only  co-operatives, 
stock companies and corporate farms as the main legal form of the former state owned co-
operatives are considered (+2.66). Interestingly, the cash flow parameters show nearly no 
difference  between  East  and  West  Germany  with  regard  to  the  impact  on  the 
disinvestment  probability.  It  seems  that  liquidity  has  the  same  importance  in  the 
disinvestment decision regardless of the capital market conditions. In the Western federal 
states, the effect of finance on the investment decision is less pronounced than on the 
disinvestment  decision.  The  marginal  effects  for  the  Western  federal  states  affirm  a 
positive  relation  of  the  cash  flow  and  the  probability  to  invest  (+0.09)  whereas  the 
relation is negative for the disinvestment threshold (-0.29). In the East, the effects have 
the same direction as in the West but are more pronounced (+0.35 and -0.36).  
It can be shown that irreversibility, uncertainty and the dependence of finance coexist and 
affect investment decisions of farms. Under weaker conditions in the capital market the 
availability of finance is more important confirmed by the higher cash flow sensitivity in 
East  Germany.  In  table 5  the  results  of  the  second  stage  regression  explaining  the 
(dis)investment rates and the results of the rather simple benchmark model (14) are given. 
The estimates confirm a positive and significant relation of the derived shadow value of 
capital to the investment and disinvestment rates. However, the point estimates are rather 
low. These findings are consistent with the theoretical model and give evidence on the 
quadratic term of the adjustment cost function. The point estimates in East and West for 
the disinvestment equation are higher than the point estimates for the investment equation 
indicating asymmetric adjustments.   24 
Table 5. Results from the Second Stage Regressions  
Variable (I it/K it-1)
+ (I it/K it-1)
- (I it/K it-1)
b (I it/K it-1)
+ (I it/K it-1)
- (I it/K it-1)
b
 q it 0.048 0.143 0.16 0.027 0.203 0.264
[0.014]** [0.006]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.002]** [0.007]**
CF it/K it-1 0.106 0.072 0.133 0.211 0.071 0.137
[0.014]** [0.006]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.003]** [0.005]**
Constant 0.141 -0.193 0.017 0.109 -0.179 -0.007
[0.015]** [0.007]** [0.010] [0.021]** [0.003]** [0.008]
Observations 4 352 6 385 10 737 15 333 28 899 44 232
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. Single (*) and double (**) asterisks denote significant at 5 % and 1 %, respectively.  
East Germany West Germany
 
The constant term is not rejected at the 1 % significance level attesting the linear term of 
the adjustment cost function. The unequal point estimates suggest costly reversibility. The 
constant term is expected to be negative, which is only confirmed by the disinvestment 
equations. Interestingly, the cash flow sensitivity is rather low for the East and West. The 
investment cash flow relation is positive and at first glance, this relation seems different 
compared to the financial parameter in the theoretical model. As mentioned above, an 
inverse relationship between the cash flow and investment is required. An increase in the 
inverse cash flow would induce increasing investment rates even though the sign of the 
inverse cash flow in the investment equation is negative. This reduction of the investment 
rate arises from the additional transaction costs in imperfect capital markets but declines 
as financial ability increases.  
The results of the simpler benchmark model, ( ) 1
b
it it I K - , which does not account for any 
selectivity bias and ignores the range of inaction, show that the parameter estimates differ 
in comparison to the results of the second stage regressions. The constant term is rejected 
in the simple model and the quadratic term of the adjustment cost function is given a 
higher weight compared to the second stage regressions. Ambiguously, the impact of the 
cash flow on investment, i.e. the cash flow sensitivity, is overestimated in the East and 
underestimated in the West. At first glance there is no statement possible which model   25 
should be preferred. Therefore, the Chow-test, based on the F-test, is applied in order to 
test if the parameter estimates differ leading to a separate estimation of the investment 
and disinvestment equations (DAVIDSON and MACKINNON 2004). The Chow-test rejects 
the null of equal parameters at 1 %. This confirms the differences  – founded in a more 
sophisticated  theoretical  basis –   and  indirectly,  the  need  to  account  for  the  range  of 
inaction.  
Conclusions 
The aim of this study has been to explain empirically observed phenomena as frequent 
periods  of  zero  investments,  high  investment  reluctance  and  in  transition  economies, 
rather  low  investment  rates  despite  the  need  of  rationalization  and  modernization 
investments.  More  precisely,  the  intention  has  been  to  show  that  imperfect  capital 
markets, irreversibility and uncertainty coexist and jointly affect investment behavior of 
farms.  Imperfect  capital  markets  released  by  agency  problems  induce  additional 
transaction costs to acquire finance or even a limited access to capital. However, impacts 
of agency problems and informational asymmetries in the capital market cannot solely 
explain investment reluctance. Costly reversibility and uncertain future expectations lead 
to retention and a range of inactivity along the optimal path of investment. Therefore, we 
have defined a stochastic and dynamic investment model which explicitly accounts for 
consequences of capital market imperfections inducing the dependence on finance and for 
coexistent irreversibility and uncertain future revenues. This is achieved by an augmented 
adjustment cost function as the presence of irreversibility does not allow to use strictly 
convex adjustment costs as traditional q-theory proposes. This augmented cost function 
accounts for sunk costs, costly reversibility and transaction costs to acquire finance. The 
econometric model is consistent with the theoretical model and has the structure of a two-
sided generalized tobit model. The application of this model to German farm level panel   26 
data  delivers  insights  into  a  transition  economy  (East  Germany)  and  allows  direct 
comparisons to an established market economy (West Germany).  
The empirical results confirm coexistent capital market frictions, costly reversibility and 
uncertainty.  The  findings  support  the  hypothesis  that  farms  in  East  Germany  face 
significantly higher transaction costs expressed in terms of a higher cash flow sensitivity. 
Contrasting these findings with results from a simpler linear model, solely accounting for 
imperfect  capital  markets,  affirms  that  a  disregard  of  irreversibility  reduces  the 
informative power of such models.  
We conclude that a more general form of models like tobit models are required to account 
for both, capital market imperfections as well as sunk costs and the respective range of 
inaction. These insights provide a new basis to explain farm growth, development of farm 
structure and thus structural change. Beyond the scientific guess of this paper the results 
imply that farmers’ reluctance to invest is a result of dynamically optimal behavior when 
capital  markets  are  perfect.  Hence,  a  slow capacity adjustment per se does not justify 
policy intervention. When additionally capital markets are imperfect, retention of capacity 
adjustments increases as access to capital is limited. If there is evidence on imperfect 
capital markets, policy intervention should also focus on the reduction of the degree of 
imperfection to facilitate finance. The design of support schemes, for instance investment 
subsidies or retirement programs in the context of payments from the European Union, 
should take these findings into account.  
Nonetheless,  we  are  aware  that  the  empirical  model  specification  has  potential  for 
improvement.  Main  point  for  future  research  is  the  consideration  of  unobserved 
heterogeneity within the estimation. Another important issue refers to the comparison of 
the complex tobit model with the simpler linear model. After we have shown the limited 
validity of such models, we further aim to quantify the direction of the expected bias   27 
within empirical applications disregarding the range of inaction and to find out how this 
bias limits conclusions drawn from such findings.  
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